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The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative:  






The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCI) and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI) were both implemented based on an assumption derived from the debt overhang hypothesis – 
that is, that the removal of excessive debt burdens would help to boost investment and economic 
growth.  Using a quasi-experimental research design to compare the performance of investment and 
growth between LICs that have benefited from HIPCI and MDRI and those that have not, this study 
assesses whether the two programs have yielded the expected effects. The results indicate that while 
debt relief programmes have led to higher private-sector investment in beneficiary countries, they 
have not had any effect on public sector investment and growth. While the reasons for this outcome 
are not entirely clear, assumptions concerning the benefits that accrue to LICs as a result of debt 
relief appear to be in doubt. 
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The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCI) and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI) are arguably the most comprehensive debt relief operations undertaken in bi- and multilateral 
development cooperation thus far. Since the initiation of HIPCI in 1996, its enhancement in 1999 and 
the launch of MDRI in 2006, a total of 32 Low Income Countries (LICs) have benefited from 
irrevocable debt cancellation, reducing their average debt burden from 160 percent of GDP in 1992 to 
around 30 percent in 2010.3 Thus, the two consecutive initiatives have enabled LICs burdened with 
unsustainable levels of external public and publically guaranteed debt (PPGD) to return to viable fiscal 
conditions and less critical balance-of-payments positions. 
The approach taken under the HIPCI and MDRI is unprecedented in several respects: First, it 
represents a strategy for a permanent exit from the serial rescheduling of official bilateral debt under 
the auspices of the Paris Club (Gautam, 2003), going well beyond temporary relief in debt service 
payments.4 Second, it follows the principle of burden sharing, and for the first time covers debt owed 
to bilateral, multilateral and commercial creditors.5 Third, although debtor countries have to negotiate 
their specific terms individually, it sets commonly applied, sustainability-oriented eligibility criteria 
and a predefined programme for macro-economic stabilization, fiscal consolidation, and poverty 
reduction that is mandatory for irrevocable debt cancellation. 
While these ostensibly laudable programmes have been embraced enthusiastically by the largest part 
of the community of development practitioners, NGOs, and academia, they hinge crucially on the 
validity of the debt overhang hypothesis. This hypothesis states that highly indebted poor countries 
suffer from low levels of investment and economic growth partly because they are confronted with an 
inherited debt stock that disincentivises investment and productivity enhancing adjustment efforts, as 
future returns would accrue primarily to creditors.6 Conversely, the removal of a debt overhang would 
be an appropriate means for boosting investment and economic growth. 
While commonly accepted, these assumptions have been challenged by various academics who instead 
suggest that unsustainable debt is primarily an outcome rather than a cause. According to Easterly 
(2002) and Arslanalp and Henry (2004, 2006), inherently unfavourable socioeconomic characteristics 
prevailing in LICs’ debtor societies, including patrimonial governance structures, interest group 
polarization and political instability, result in a strong preference for high near-future public 
expenditure financed through debt expansion. From the perspective of these authors, debt relief is 
                                                
3 As by December 2011, for a list of countries see Appendix II. 
4 According to Gautman (2003), objective formulation became more ambiguous over time. Whereas in 1995 the World Bank 
only considered debt reduction as part of a broader strategy, in 1999, when the original HIPCI was enhanced, it was declared 
to aim at providing a clear and permanent exit from unsustainable debt burdens. 
5 It showed that the objective of including commercial claimants has not fully been met as HIPCI does not have a legally 
binding character. Various commercial creditors have refused to participate or engaged in litigation. At least 20 HIPCs have 
been threatened or subject to litigation by commercial creditors (Gueye et al., 2007). 
6 The term “debt overhang” achieved prominence in a paper by Krugman (1988). His theoretical work aimed to show that 
under certain conditions, an inherited high debt stock creates significant disincentives for the debtor to make efforts to 
redeem obligations in full. Accordingly, creditors can minimize their losses by pursuing a combination of defensive lending 
and conditional debt relief.  
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ineffective in stimulating investment and growth, as beneficiary LICs can be expected to return to the 
previous unsustainable fiscal and macro-economic policy stance after receiving debt treatment. 
The HIPCI and MDRI can be used to shed more light on this fundamental dispute in development 
economics. Since 1996, 32 countries of a total of 80 LICs have under HIPCI and MDRI undergone 
and completed unprecedented debt relief and debt restructuring programs.7 This provides an ideal 
treatment and control group setting, in which the validity of the debt overhang hypothesis can be 
tested indirectly. Using difference-in-differences analysis, which is suitable for non-randomised 
treatment selection, this paper assesses the extent to which debt relief under the HIPCI and MDRI has 
indeed been associated with a measurable increase in productivity, investment and growth. 
The empirical results are somewhat sobering: While the HIPCI and MDRI appear to have been 
partially successful in stimulating total and particularly private investment, a measurable positive 
effect on public investment cannot be seen. Since public investment is at least as important for 
enhancing economic growth as private investment, an important channel for stimulating per capita 
income appears dysfunctional. Furthermore, the HIPCI and MDRI have not led to a measurable 
increase in productivity in beneficiary countries. As the results presented here confirm the findings of 
past studies that identify productivity growth as a principal source of per capita income growth (e.g. 
Easterly and Levine, 2001; Pattillo et al., 2003), the systematic weaker growth performance of HIPCs 
in comparison to non-HIPCs is not very surprising. All in all, these findings call into question the 
assumptions of the debt overhang hypothesis, which sees a causal chain between debt, investment and 
growth. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical and current empirical literature on 
debt relief in developing countries, placing a particular emphasis on the debt overhang debate. After 
providing an overview of the context and procedures for implementing the HIPC and MDRI in Section 
3, Sections 4 presents the modelling strategy and results, and also provides an interpretation of the 
findings. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Theoretical Underpinning for Debt Relief – A Brief Literature Review 
The Latin American debt crisis, which brought the global financial system close to the brink of 
collapse, sparked a series of theoretical and empirical studies on international sovereign borrowing in 
which the debt overhang hypothesis emerged as a conceptual centrepiece (Krugman, 1988; Sachs, 
1989) subsequently used as an argumentative underpinning for debt relief initiatives such as the HIPCI 
and MDRI.8  
In his seminal contribution, Krugman (1988) uses a two-period utility model under uncertainty to 
suggest that once a country has accumulated an external debt larger than the expected present value 
                                                
7 As by December 2011, see Appendix II. 
8 The debt overhang model was first developed in corporate finance (see Myers, 1977). 
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(PV) of potential future transfers to its creditors, the debtor country is disincentivized to implement 
productivity enhancing fiscal and macro-economic adjustment that would augment national income 
and, in turn, the government's debt servicing capabilities. Disincentives are said to result from 
economic returns accruing entirely or large part to a country’s creditors, leaving the debtor with an 
insufficiently small reform dividend.  
Sachs (1989) makes a similar point. He develops an intertemporal utility model distinct from 
Krugman’s in that a country’s adjustment efforts are captured solely through the debtor country’s 
aggregate investment choice. Sachs shows that an excessive external debt stock and the resulting 
service burden distort the investment choice, thereby inducing an inefficiently low level of future 
output. This occurs as in the presence of a debt overhang, debt service ceases to be a function of 
formally outstanding obligations. Instead, future transfers to a country’s creditors are constrained by 
its ability to pay, i.e. by the size of its future gross national product. Consequently, any effort to 
augment future output via current capital accumulation, i.e. investment, is subject to debt-induced 
distortionary taxation. To overcome this dilemma, Sachs proposes the reduction of external debt to 
manageable levels such that the character of debt service is transformed from a marginal tax to a lump-
sum burden. Consequently, the adverse distortive effects of debt on investment would be removed 
with debt service ceasing to impair aggregate investment.  
While the theoretical argument for debt relief was motivated by a sovereign debt crisis, in Sachs’ 
analytical framework the investment decision is modelled as a national aggregate and is therefore 
applied to total, i.e. private and public, investment. This implies the existence of a mechanism 
whereby the public socio-economic cost of an external debt overhang is internalized in private-sector 
investment decisions (Borensztein, 1990; Diwan and Rodrik, 1992). Thus, it is assumed that if the 
public sector accumulates external debt levels perceived as unsustainable by domestic and foreign 
private investors, the latter lower their return expectations as they anticipate the burdens of future 
public debt service, whether this burden is explicit – in the form of higher taxation – or implicit – 
through the costs of macroeconomic instability (Patillo et al., 2003).  
Interestingly, empirical work aiming to verify the debt overhang hypothesis has, probably for practical 
reasons, in most cases elided Krugman’s more complex notion of productivity enhancing structural 
adjustment effort. Instead, it syncopated the analysis to factor accumulation via the debt-investment-
nexus. Warner (1992), estimating investment functions and examining out-of-sample forecasts for 13 
developing countries considered to have accumulated an external debt overhang prior to 1982, finds 
no evidence for a debt-induced contraction of investment. He instead suggests that the observed 
decline in investment in the wake of the debt crisis in 1982 can be attributed to the same adverse 
economic shocks that caused the global recession. Chauvin and Kraay (2005) indirectly test the debt-
investment and debt-growth link by estimating the growth and the investment enhancing effects of 
sovereign debt relief using a sample of 62 LICs from 1989 to 2003. They do not find evidence that 
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debt relief positively affects aggregate investment and economic growth. This partly confirms earlier 
findings by Cohen (1997), who argues that the level of external debt does little to explain economic 
growth.  
The effort to define a debt overhang threshold for developing countries beyond which the marginal 
impact of debt on investment and growth turns negative has also yielded inconclusive results. 
Elbadawi et al. (1997) infer an overhang threshold at approx. 100 percent of GDP. Pattillo et al. (2002) 
identify a much lower threshold (a present-value debt stock amounting to approx. 20 percent of GDP). 
Imbs and Ranciere (2005) suggest that a threshold exists at a present-value debt stock of around 40 
percent of GDP. 
A recent strand in the literature has moved from the mono-causal capital accumulation paradigm 
towards a duo-causal approach that incorporates Krugman’s notion of productivity enhancing policy. 
Pattillo et al. (2003) find evidence that the negative effect of debt on growth primarily operates 
through total factor productivity (TFP), while the negative effect of debt on physical capital 
accumulation is only of subordinate importance. The contribution by Pattillo et al. (2003) draws 
heavily on empirical findings by Easterly and Levine (2001), who argue that TFP rather than factor 
accumulation is the main source of economic growth.  
The debt overhang hypothesis is, however, clearly grounded on the assumption that developing 
countries will be willing and able to implement productivity enhancing reforms and investment if the 
debt overhang is removed. Easterly (2002) challenges this assumption, suggesting that debt relief fails 
to provide a viable exit strategy from excessive borrowing, as it neglects the underlying cause for debt 
accumulation. Analyzing a sample of 41 highly indebted LICs for the period from 1979 to 1997, he 
finds evidence that over-indebtedness appears to be caused by inherently high discount rates against 
the future. According to Easterly (2002), such high discount rates are the consequence of patrimonial 
governance structures, interest group polarization and political instability. Due to a highly uncertain 
future, the elites exercising allocational control over the country’s resources display a strong 
preference for debt-financed current and near-term consumption, thereby imposing high discounts on 
the far distant returns from long-term economic activities. Easterly finds that LICs that have 
undergone non-concessional or concessional debt rescheduling, have – presumably due to those 
underlying elites’ intertemporal preferences – re-accumulated similarly large debt stocks, or, if new 
external borrowing had been restricted, drawn down public assets. However, a principal caveat 
concerning Easterly’s findings is that they have been derived from data mainly covering a period in 
which the external public debt of highly indebted LICs was rescheduled at concessional terms and not 
forgiven (1979-1994), thereby in many cases further increasing the PV of outstanding debt (cf. Section 
3).  
In an effort to reconcile Easterly’s claim with previous findings regarding the effect of debt on 
investment and growth, Presbitero (2008) and Cordella et al. (2010) assess the effects of external 
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indebtedness and quality of governance on aggregate investment and economic growth. Cordella et al. 
(2010), in a study covering 79 developing countries for the time period from 1970 to 2002, find the 
debt-investment and debt-growth nexus to be statistically irrelevant for highly indebted countries with 
bad institutions and policies. At the same time, they detect a negative marginal effect of public 
external indebtedness on growth and investment beyond a debt PV-to-GDP threshold of 25 percent for 
countries with good governance. This is consistent with previous findings by Prespitero (2008), 
according to which the link between indebtedness and economic growth depends on institutional 
quality, such that debt relief is likely to be more effective in developing countries with sound 
governance standards. Arslanalp and Henry (2004 and 2006), by contrast, claim the debt overhang 
hypothesis to be inapplicable to most sub-Saharan Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). Due to 
these countries’ poor macro-economic performance, generally weak institutional frameworks, and 
resulting low productivity, long-term profitable economic activity is significantly hampered.  
Thus, it remains unclear whether the large-scale cancellation of debt for countries judged as suffering 
from a debt overhang is indeed effective in inducing a higher rate of economic growth through 
enhanced investment activity and/or an increase in total factor productivity. In an effort to clarify this 
issue, the present paper assesses the extent to which LICs whose debt stock has been reduced to 
sustainable levels under HIPCI and MDRI have been able to attain higher investment and growth rates 
in comparison to LICs that have not benefited from debt cancellation. 
3. Overview of Recent Debt Rescheduling Operations 
Although innovative in several regards, HIPCI and MDRI only represent a preliminary end-point in a 
series of increasingly concessional debt restructuring initiatives conducted under the auspices of the 
Club of Paris and the IMF.9  
a. The Paris Club 
During the 1970s and most of the 1980s, the period in which many LICs accumulated unsustainable 
external public debt positions, the modus operandi consisted in non-concessional flow rescheduling of 
long-term official bilateral debt under the auspices of the Paris Club (Boote and Thugge, 1997). 
Typically, only the interest and principal for debt due during a rather short consolidation period were 
subject to deferral or restructuring (Daseking and Powell, 1999). To protect the preferred creditor 
status of the IMF and World Bank, multilateral debt remained excluded from treatment (Kuhn et al., 
1994). LICs undergoing Paris Club rescheduling were requested to implement structural adjustment 
                                                
9 The Paris Club is an informal group consisting of 19 permanent OECD member countries with large exposures to other 
states. Those are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the USA. The IMF 
plays an important advisory role. The UNCTAD, the World Bank and the RDBs have observer’s status. The Secretariat of the 
club is hosted by the French Treasury. For a more detailed delineation of the Paris Club’s history and method of operation the 
reader is referred to Cosio-Pascal (2008). 
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programs with the IMF (Cosio-Pascal, 2008; Boote et al., 1998).10 Accordingly, restructuring was 
primarily aimed at providing a time window for the implementation of macro-economic adjustments 
that would permit a re-assumption of normal relations with the debtor country’s creditors (Callaghy, 
2004; Mistry, 1994). Hence, at that time, the notion of rescheduling was inherently one of adjusting 
the way out of debt distress. 
However, as external public debt levels continued to rise dramatically in many LICs during the 1980s 
(Figure 1), the conventional approach of limited non-concessional case-by-case service rescheduling 
for bilateral debt appeared increasingly inappropriate (Mistry, 1992). In response, Paris Club debt 
treatment operations between 1988 and 1995 became increasingly concessional but remained limited 
to flow rescheduling, i.e. the restructuring of eligible debt service. At the G7 summit held in 1988 in 
Toronto, it was agreed that LICs would be granted a reduction of 22 to 33 percent of the PV of debt 
service falling due in the consolidation periods under future Paris Club rescheduling operations 
(Toronto Terms). The degree of concessionality was further increased to up to 50 percent at the G7 
summit of 1991 in London (London Terms).11 
Nevertheless, the scope of these concessional rescheduling operations remained highly limited for 
various reasons. First, the increasing volume of outstanding multilateral debt continued to be excluded 
from rescheduling and cancellation (Mistry, 1994; Dijkstra, 2008; Boote et al., 1994). Second, the 
volume of long-term bilateral debt treated under Paris Club agreements remained very modest in 
relation to overall outstanding external debt, as PV reductions were only applied to the service of debt 
issued before a certain cutoff date and falling due in the consolidation period. Third, as part of their 
defensive lending strategies, official bi- and multilateral creditors continued to provide new financing, 
further aggravating the existing debt problem. Due to these limiting factors the debt consolidated 
under Toronto Terms and London Terms amounted to only USD 6 billion and USD 9 billion, 
respectively, while the overall nominal external stock of long-term PPGD owed by beneficiary 
countries stood at USD 106 billion by the end of 1996.12 
In a first attempt to provide a permanent exit to perpetual rescheduling, the G7 at its Naples summit in 
1994 further enhanced the degree of concessionality under Paris Club arrangements.13 Under the 
Naples Terms, highly indebted LICs would receive a PV reduction of 67 percent on eligible debt. 
Furthermore, the consolidation period was significantly extended, and now covered between two and 
three years (generally coinciding with the implementation of an IMF structural adjustment program).14 
                                                
10 The IMF’s macro-economic adjustment programmes were from the mid-1980s provided under concessional lending 
facilities – from 1986 to 1987 through the Structural Adjustment Facilities (SAF); from 1987 to 1999 through the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facilities (ESAF); and from 1999, through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). 
11 Toronto and London Terms included a menu of options for providing debt and debt-service reduction to LICs. 
12 In this context consolidation does not imply full cancellation but only restructuring at concessional terms.  
13 The G7 proposal was endorsed by Paris Club members in December 1994. Naples Terms were applied between January 
1995 and November 1996. 
14 Eligibility criteria for the 67 percent PV reduction under Naples Terms were i) an income of 500 USD per capita and below 
and ii) a debt stock (PV) to exports ratio of 350 percent or more. LICs failing to meet these criteria only received a 50 percent 
PV reduction (Boote et al., 1995). 
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More importantly, for the first time, concessional Paris Club modalities went beyond flow treatment: 
Upon satisfactory completion of IMF programs, an exit rescheduling option allowed for a stock of 
debt treatment, namely a 67 percent PV reduction in external long-term public debt owed to Paris Club 
members (Boote et al., 1998).15 
Figure 1: PPGD by creditor as a share of HIPC GDP  
 
Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2012. 
b. Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives 
While this enhancement of concessionality contributed to slowing down and eventual halting the 
continuous growth of highly indebted LICs’ PPGD (see Figure 1), it became evident that without the 
inclusion of multilateral debt in future debt relief operations, a substantive and sustainable reduction in 
highly indebted poor LICs’ external PPGD stocks would not be achievable. Under continuously 
growing pressure, in 1995 the World Bank and the IMF switched from fundamental opposition to 
relief deals to the role of fair brokers for a comprehensive and once-and-for-all debt reduction program 
that would encompass multilateral, bilateral and private debt (Callaghy, 2004).16 
In autumn of 1996, the executive boards of the IMF and the World Bank endorsed the staff proposals 
for a comprehensive reform program: the HIPC Initiative. Its core objective was to reduce HIPCs 
                                                
15 London Terms already contained a goodwill clause allowing for debt stock treatment upon satisfactory completion of IMF-
supported programs that, however, had not been applied (Boote and Thugge, 1997; Boote et al., 1998). Naples Terms debt-
stock treatment was provided to Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Mali and Uganda (Boote et al., 1998). 
16 It is interesting to note that while the IMF and the World Bank in most of their official documents claim at least the role of 
accoucheur of HIPC, the two institutions until 1995 repeatedly disavowed the fact that LICs undergoing serial Paris Club 
rescheduling were facing embarrassingly severe solvency crises. Instead they repeatedly claimed that those countries where 
primarily facing short-lived liquidity constraints. An excellent account of the evolving political-economy processes leading to 
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overall external debt stock – including multilateral debt – to sustainable levels (World Bank and IMF, 
1996). As the initial HIPCI got off to a slow start and appeared to be insufficient in scale to attain its 
goals, the terms and eligibility thresholds were reviewed and substantively lowered in September 
1999.17 Under a revised HIPCI framework, known as Enhanced HIPCI (E-HIPCI), the original core 
objective was extended to additionally target economic development and poverty reduction (World 
Bank and IMF, 1999, Gautam, 2003). To ensure that the fiscal space gained from debt service and 
debt stock cancellation would be used for additional poverty reduction spending, beneficiary 
governments were required under E-HIPCI to develop and implement comprehensive Poverty 
Reduction Strategies, which had to be approved by the Bank and the Fund (World Bank and IMF, 
1999).18  
Eligibility under HIPCI and E-HIPCI was subject to two pre-conditions: Potential beneficiaries had to 
be eligible for funding under the World Bank’s concessional lending arm, the International 
Development Association (IDA); and they were required to successfully complete Naples Terms 
restructuring. The ultimate decision on a country’s participation under HIPCI and E-HIPCI was taken 
based on a tripartite debt sustainability analysis, jointly conducted by the staff of the IMF, the World 
Bank and country authorities. If the results suggested that the external debt stock after Naples Terms 
treatment would continue to range above predefined sustainability thresholds, the respective country 
became eligible for HIPCI and later E-HIPCI treatment.19 The purpose of the debt sustainability 
analysis in this context was twofold: First, it served as a tool for determining external PV debt stock in 
order to assess HIPCI/E-HIPCI eligibility. Second, it was used to project the development of the 
country’s external debt position under several plausible medium-term macroeconomic scenarios in 
order to determine the volume of relief required to bring the debt below sustainability thresholds.20 
The burden of relief operations is shared among multilateral, official bilateral and commercial 
                                                
17 According to Gautam (2003), from 1996 to 1999, only seven countries reached the decision point and became eligible for 
debt relief. While the dissatisfactory slow start of the HIPCI might have played a role, the pressure of debtor governments, 
the G7, civil societies and NGOs upon the World Bank and IMF to lower the thresholds seems to have been pivotal for the 
enhancement of the initiative (Callaghy, 2004). 
18 Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) should contain an assessment of poverty and its key determinates, set targets for 
poverty reduction, prioritize government activity to achieve development objectives, establish a monitoring framework that 
maps poverty trends and can be used to evaluate the impact of government interventions, and describe the participatory 
process in preparation of the strategy (World Bank, 2002). As the participatory development of comprehensive PRSs 
threatened to delay implementation, an interim-PRSs was also deemed sufficient to qualify for irrevocable debt cancellation 
under E-HIPCI. Interim PRSs were considered a binding commitment, containing a statement of intent and a roadmap for 
developing and implementing a full PRSs (Gautam, 2003).  
19 The principal sustainability threshold was the ratio of the PV of the debt stock in PV terms to gross exports of 150 percent 
(200-250 percent under HIPCI). For very open economies with gross exports amounting to above 30 percent of GDP (40 
percent under HIPCI), an alternative fiscal criterion, the PV debt stock to central government revenue ratio  (250 percent 
under E-HIPCI and 280 percent under HIPCI) was applied (Gueye et al. 2007; Gautam, 2003). As a necessary condition for 
the application of the alternative criterion, the ratio of budget revenue/GDP had to be above 15 percent (20 percent under 
HIPCI) (Gueye et al. 2007). 
20 Although not used as an explicit threshold, the E-HIPIC aimed at reducing the PV-debt to GDP ratio to a level comparable 
to that of non-HIPC LICs and LMIs, which were on average ranging around 40 percent of GDP. As the projections of future 
debt levels critically depend upon assumptions regarding key macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth, exchange rate 
trends, revenue mobilization, etc., conducting debt sustainability analysis was a highly political undertaking. As documented 
by Gautam (2003), these projections, particularly the growth rate and export share projections, were often overly optimistic 
such that at the completion point, sustainability thresholds could not be met.  
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creditors in proportion to their share in the PV of outstanding debt at the time of the country’s 
qualification for HIPCI or E-HIPCI (Gueye et al., 2007).21  
Countries qualifying for the HIPCI – i.e. who had reached, in official jargon, the “Decision Point” – 
were required during an interim period to implement another IMF macroeconomic stabilization 
program. During this interim period, as under previous Paris Club arrangements, beneficiary countries 
received substantive debt service reduction. In the case of pre-cut-off bilateral debt, these reductions in 
almost all cases amount to 100 percent, whereas the terms for flow treatment of multilateral debt were 
generally less generous.22 After completing the IMF’s program and demonstrating the successful 
implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy, the country would reach the so-called “Completion 
Point,” upon which remaining relief was provided in the form of bilateral debt stock cancellation and – 
depending on the terms applied by the individual multilateral organisation – continued service relief or 
in some cases stock treatment for multilateral debt.23 
Through the increasingly concessional and comprehensive Paris Club terms HIPCs’ PPGD owed to 
bilateral creditors as a share of GDP was slashed from around 70 percent of GDP in 1994 to 30 
percent by 2005. Yet by 2005, the share of multilateral PPGD still stood at 60 percent of GDP (cf. 
Figure 1). As particularly OECD and Paris Club members were demanding greater contributions by 
multilateral institutions, in July 2005 the G8 proposed another relief initiative, which this time was to 
focus solely on the comprehensive reduction of multilateral debt. In January 2006, the IMF and 
African Development Fund (AfDF) began implementation of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI).24 IDA and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) joined in July 2006 and January 
2007, respectively. Under MDRI, the debt to AfDF, IMF and IDB which had been issued prior to 2005 
and all IDA debt issued prior to 2004 would be cancelled for HIPCs reaching the Completion Point.25 
The overall volume of MDRI is estimated at USD 57 billion in nominal terms (Gueye et al., 2007).26 
By the end of 2011, 32 countries had reached the HIPCI Decision Point and were benefiting from 
relief under MDRI.  
                                                
21 As described by Gueye et al. (2007), the reduction of commercial debt under HIPC was mainly achieved through the 
Commercial Debt Reduction Facility, which provides grants co-funded by IDA, France, Germany, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA to buy back commercial debt. As the HIPCI and E-
HIPCI have no legally binding character, HIPCs had hardly any leverage to achieve substantive relief on commercial debt. At 
least 20 HIPCs have been addressees of litigation measures pertaining to commercial debt amounting to approx. USD 2 
billion (Gueye et. al., 2007). 
22 This refers to non-concessional (i.e. non-ODA) debt. Original Paris Club cutoff dates were maintained under HIPCI and E-
HIPCI unless treatment of pre-cutoff-date non-concessional debt proved insufficient to meet HIPCs sustainability thresholds 
(Gueye et al., 2007). A list of the cutoff dates by country applied under HIPCI and E-HICI is provided in Appendix I. Under 
E-HIPCI terms, the entire concessional debt stock (i.e. ODA loans) contracted prior to and after the cutoff date was subject to 
cancellation (Vilanova and Martin, 2001).  
23 A detailed description of the individual debt relief arrangements applied by multilateral organisations is provided in Gueye 
et al. (2007). 
24 The African Development Fund is the concessional lending arm of the African Development Bank. 
25 Furthermore, the following conditions had to be met: i) satisfactory performance on the IMF’s macroeconomic 
programmes, ii) satisfactory implementation of the country’s PRS, and iii) no adverse development in Public Financial 
Management. (Hurley, 2007).  
26 A flow chart for the HIPCI and MDRI relief framework is provided in Appendix III. Appendix IV provides an overview on 
the volume, modalities and degrees of concessionality of relief operations since 1988. 
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4. Testing the Debt Overhang Hypothesis 
The total amount of debt cancelled under HIPCI, E-HIPCI and MDRI is estimated at 109.8 billion 
USD (in end-2010 PV terms).27 Through the substantive reduction of HIPCs’ debt, the average ratio of 
nominal PPGD to GDP declined on average from its all-time high of 160 percent in 1994 to approx. 
30 percent in 2010; a level comparable to that of non-HIPC control group countries (Table 1).  
Table 1: Public and Publically Guaranteed Debt as a Share of GDP 
Year  HIPCs Non-HIPCs 
1994 
Average 159.48 63.86 
Obs. 28 30 
2010 
Average 27.17 28.41 
Obs. 29 30 
Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2012. 
This provides the basis for the following considerations: As highlighted in Section 2, efforts to 
empirically determine a viable and robust threshold beyond which the marginal impact of debt on 
investment and growth turns negative remain inconclusive (Warner, 1992; Cohen, 1997; Elbadawi et 
al., 1997; Pattillo et al., 2002; Pattillo et al., 2003; Chauvin and Kraay, 2005; Imbs and Ranciere, 
2005). However, irrespective of where the true threshold level may fall, it can be assumed that if the 
adverse mechanics of debt overhang were in effect prior to HIPCI and MDRI, they now have most 
definitely been removed, thanks to the scope of relief provided under HIPCI and MDRI. Thus, the 
removal of overhang-driven adverse effects should have induced a measurable increase in national 
investment, productivity and economic growth. 
a. Methodology 
To trace the possible effects of debt relief, in the following empirical analysis the evolution of proxy 
indicators for investment and growth of real per capita income are compared between HIPCs – a sub-
group of IDA countries and a control group, i.e. IDA countries not participating in the HIPCI and 
MDRI. The debt relief considered here for a selected sub-group of IDA countries can be modelled as a 
quasi-experimental setting with the non-random assignment of countries to either the treatment group, 
i.e. IDA countries receiving debt relief, or to the control group, i.e. IDA countries that have not 
received debt relief (Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Meyer, 1995; Buckley and 
Shang, 2003). Therefore, a feasible methodology for quantifying HIPCs response behaviour would be 
to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). 
A first simple strategy is to draw on the baseline specification of a difference-in-differences estimator 
that is derived from the equation for repeated cross-sectional observations in the form of 
(1)   , , ,  for 1,....,  and   0,1i t i i i i i tY T t T t i N t            , 
                                                
27 IDA and IMF (2011) preliminary estimates for HIPCI and E-HICI: 76.0 billion USD (end-2001 PV terms, excluding relief 
under Naples terms) and MDRI: 33.8 billion USD (end-2010 PV terms). 
12 
 
where Yi,t denotes the outcome variable, T is the treatment dummy (0,1), and t indicates the pre- and 
post-treatment periods for which observational data of the outcome variable are available. The error 
term i captures all omitted determinates of iY . The coefficient  represents the ATET and is 
consistently estimated through 
(2)   1 0 1 0ˆ    T T C CDD Y Y Y Y , 
or applying OLS on the differenced equation in the form of  
(3)  ,1 ,0i i i iY Y T      , 
where   captures the joint time trend in the control and treatment group. The estimator is efficient and 
un-biased if  
(4)       cov , 0;  cov , 0;  cov , 0     i i i i i i iT t t T .28 
However, particularly the last of these three assumptions, which implies a parallel time trend among 
treated and controls, is critical.29 It can be relaxed through the incorporation of time invariant and time 
variant covariates that are expected to cause different trends in outcomes among treated and controls 
alike, such that   
(5)   , ,i t i i i i i t it t i tY T t T t            x z φ  
where t and tφ are the effects of the time invariant (pre-treatment) and time variant covariates on the 
outcome for each of the two time points (Meyer, 1995; Buckley and Shang, 2003). Differencing yields 
(6)   ,1 ,0i i i i i i iY Y T t          x z φ , with  
(7)   i i i              ix x x x and  i i i        1 1 i0 0 1 0z φ z φ z φ z φ φ . 
As changes in time variant covariates may result from treatment, i.e. could possibly be endogenous, 
they should be applied carefully.  
While the specification presented here uses repeated cross sections, most empirical studies have 
applied difference-in-differences estimations on panel data. However, as Bertrand et al. (2004) show, 
difference-in-differences estimations based on long panel data significantly underestimate standard 
errors of the treatment effect coefficient, due to serial correlation of the outcome variable. This in turn 
leads to an over-rejection of the null hypothesis (i.e. that the average treatment effect is not different 
from zero). To avoid this common problem, the approach used here applies one possible solution 
proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004) – to collapse the panel data to a repeated cross-section by averaging 
pre- and post-treatment period observations. This brings down the rejection rate to the expected level 
                                                
28 Under these assumptions the simple Diff-in-Diff estimator is unbiased as  1 0 1 0ˆ                     T T C CDDE E Y E Y E Y E Y  
                     . 
29 If the parallel trend assumption is violated, such that , than  will be biased as
 1 0 1 0ˆ                                       T T C C T CDDE E Y E Y E Y E Y . 
   cov , ,     i i i i i it T E t T
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and, according to the authors, works well even for a small number of treatment and control cross-
sections.30 
As outlined in Section 3, substantive debt cancellation did not taken place prior to the introduction of 
Naples Terms, which were first applied in an agreement with Guinea in January 1995 (Boote et. al., 
1998). Accordingly, pre-treatment observations for each country are calculated from averages of the 
respective outcome variable for the period from 1991 to 1994, i.e. the time before Naples terms were 
adopted. Post-treatment observations are obtained by averaging the respective outcome variables for 
the period from 2008 to 2011.31 Averages, in this context, are expected to provide more reliable point 
estimates for pre- and post-treatment observations as short term fluctuations are levelled out. 
The overall sample comprises countries that theoretically would have been eligible for debt relief 
under HIPCI/E-HIPCI and MDRI, i.e. all countries which were entitled to borrow at IDA terms as of 
end 1994. All IDA countries that underwent Naples flow and stock treatment, subsequently qualified 
for HIPCI or the enhanced framework and successfully reached completion point by end 2010, thereby 
benefiting from MDRI, were assigned to the treatment group.32 The control group, by contrast, 
includes all IDA countries that have not benefited from structured Paris Club and multilateral 
concessional debt treatment since 1995.33 The number of countries in the treatment and control groups 
is fairly balanced (29 treatments units and 30 controls; see Appendix II).  
b. Debt Overhang and Investment 
As outlined in Section 2, according to Sachs (1988) and the related strand of literature, over-
indebtedness is expected to induce an inefficiently low level of investment as future output is subject 
to marginal taxation in the form of debt service. In order to assess the potential effects of the HIPCI 
and MDRI on investment, the performance of appropriate proxies for national investment is analysed.  
The natural place to look at is fixed capital formation, as it provides information on the accumulation 
of non-current and illiquid assets by the public and the private sector. Figure 2 shows the three year 
moving average of total and public gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP for HIPCs and 
non-HIPCs between 1983 and 2009. 
                                                
30 In a Monte-Carlo simulation undertaken by the authors for a sample consisting of 50 cross-sections and a length of T=21, 
the rejection rate for estimating the ATET of a placebo intervention declines from around 50 percent to 5 percent for the five 
percent confidence level. 
31 Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Rep. of Congo, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and 
Liberia that are included in the treatment group only reached the completion point between 2008 and 2010, i.e. during the 
post-treatment period. However, for all of these countries the debt burden had already been substantively reduced during the 
interim period due to the suspension of interest and principal payments (flow relief) on bilateral debt and partially front 
loaded relief for multilateral debt (IDA and IMF, 2011). Furthermore, it had become clear that none of the participating 
countries would be disqualified and denied completion of HICPI and support MDRI, although several HIPCs had temporarily 
fallen off track with the IMF’s interim macro-economic stabilization programmes (Fontana, 2005). This allows assuming that 
the here considered potential disincentives stemming from a potential debt overhang would have been removed by 2008 for 
all treatment group countries.  
32 HIPCs, which did not complete the HIPCI itinerary until end-2010, were removed from the sample. This applies to Chad, 
Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea (IDA and IMF, 2011). Cf. Appendix II. 




Figure 2: GFCF for HIPCs and non-HIPCs as a percentage of GDP (three-year moving averages) 
 
Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2012. 
While throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s the average share of total gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) for HIPCs and non-HIPCs was fairly stable, HIPCs’ GFCF-to-GDP ratio stayed 
consistently below that of non-HIPCs. In subsequent years, however, HIPCs’ share of GFCF in GDP 
started to catch up, resulting in an almost complete equalization by 2007/08. As this development 
coincided with the implementation of Naples Terms relief and the subsequent HIPCI and MDRI, the 
data provide some preliminary indication that debt relief exerts a positive stimulating effect on total 
investment.  
Interestingly, as Figure 2 shows, this observation appears not to apply to public investment. Except for 
minor fluctuations, the level of public GFCF has been stagnating at between 5 and 8 percent of GDP 
for HIPCs and non-HIPCs alike. This implies that the observed increase in total investment as a 
percentage of GDP between 1995 and 2010 has primarily been driven by a rise in private investment 
ratios. Hence, if debt relief under the Naples Terms, HIPCI and MDRI has had a statistically and 
economically significant stimulating effect on investment, this apparently occurred through an 
increase in private investment. To investigate whether these preliminary indications are economically 
and statistically robust, the difference-in-differences framework as specified above is applied to 
separately estimate the ATET for total, public and private investment.  
The difference-in-differences baseline specification (Eq. 3) is associated with the risk of confounding 
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determining covariates may have been omitted. To avoid the risk of unobserved confounders, 
structural variables identified in the previous empirical research as determinant of total, public, and 
private investment – following the specification as in Eqs. 6 and 7 – have been included as pre-
treatment controls in the respective specifications.34  
Drawing on the findings by Cordella et al. (2010), the specification used here for total investment is 
modelled as function of  
i) pre-treatment GNI per capita (measured in constant 2000 US dollars),  
ii) the level of political and economic stability and governance (in this case approximated by 
the State Fragility Index developed by Marshall and Cole, 2011),35  
iii) and the degree of trade openness measured by the volume of trade as a share of GDP.  
As total investment is an aggregate of public and private investment, determinates identified as 
specific to public investment (Sturm, 2001; Clements et al. 2003) have also been included:  
iv) urbanisation, approximated by the share of the total population living in urban areas, is 
expected to induce a reduction in the demand for public investment, which mostly 
concerns infrastructure,36  
v) development aid, measured as official development assistance per capita,37 exerts a 
positive effect on investment spending as it creates additional fiscal space that allows for 
extra-recurrent expenditure, 
vi) high public debt and the resulting interest service appear to crowd out public investment, 
vii) a growing population is expected to stimulate the demand for public infrastructure, 
requiring additional public investment.  
Furthermore, a dummy for sub-Saharan African countries has been included in all three specifications 
as most HIPCs (24 out of 32) are located south of the Sahara. This is to avoid the treatment effect 
coefficient potentially being driven by regionally specific investment behaviour. 
The dependent variable is the difference between the four year pre- and post-treatment averages of the 
share of total, public, and private GFCF in GDP, thereby representing the average percentage increase 
in the control and treatment group countries during the implementation of HIPCI and MDRI. The 
                                                
34 Only covariates that can be assumed to be strictly exogenous with respect to treatment are included as time variant 
variables (cf. see Section 4b). As the summary statistics presented in Appendix V suggest, the averages of pre-treatment 
covariates – except for urbanisation – differ substantively between HIPCs and non-HIPCs such that controlling for these 
appears to be a necessary measure of prudence.  
35 The Worldwide Governance Indicators developed with a similarly large time and country coverage are available to 
measure the quality of governance more directly. However, due to the documented methodological limitations (see Kurtz and 
Schrank, 2007; Langbein and Knack, 2010; Thomas, 2010; Knoll and Zloczysti, 2012), I refrain from using them in a 
repeated cross-section estimation.  
36 This hypothesis, however, appears rather doubtful, as in many developing countries public investment lags behind the 
rapidly growing demand for infrastructure in urban areas, particularly in the fields of water and sanitation, electricity, 
transportation, public transport, sewage and waste management.  
37 Official development assistance as reported by OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System excluding assistance related to debt 
treatment received from DAC countries, i.e. OECD/DAC purpose codes 60020 (debt forgiveness), 60030 (relief of 
multilateral debt), 60040 (rescheduling and refinancing), 60061 (debt for development swap), 60062 (other debt swap), and 
60062, 60063 (debt buy-back). 
16 
 
specification used to estimate the effects of debt relief under HIPCI and MDRI on private investment 
includes those covariates of the total investment specification that are not specific to public investment 
(cf. Warner, 1992; Sturm, 2001; Clements, 2003; Cordella et al., 2010), i.e. the sub-Saharan Africa 
dummy, the State Fragility Index, the level of initial GDP per capita and the degree of trade 
openness.38 
Table 2: Effects of debt relief on total and private investment 




























































* n.a.  0.001
(1.12)
 
N 87  89  77  
Baseline 44  44  38  
- o/w control 21  22  16  
- o/w treated 23  22  22  
Follow-up 43  45  39  
- o/w control 22  24  18  
- o/w treated 21  21  21  








* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Robust standard errors (Huber/White robust variance estimates) are used. 
As the results presented in Table 2 suggest the average treatment effect on total investment amounts to 
a statistically and economically significant above time trend increase of approx. 7 percentage points in 
GDP.39 This would indicate that the debt relief provided under Naples Terms, HIPCI and MDRI is 
indeed associated with a substantive and statistically significant increase in total GFCF. In the 
                                                
38 A complete list of sources used is provided in Appendix V. 
39 For difference-in-differences estimations the STATA® algorithm devised by Villa (2011) has been used. 
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specification to estimate the ATET on total GFCF, the state fragility, trade openness, urbanization and 
development assistance covariates are statistically and economically significant.  
The results also confirm the aforedescribed data indicating that the above-average increase in total 
GFCF is entirely driven by private investment, while a positive and meaningful treatment effect on 
public GFCF is not observable. The results are robust with respect to the selection of covariates and 
also hold in the most simple difference-in-differences specification where pre-treatment control 
variables are excluded (Eq. 3).  
These findings clearly contradict the mechanics of debt relief as postulated by Sachs (1989), as well as 
the empirical findings of Clements et al. (2003), who suggest that the negative effects of high external 
sovereign debt are more pronounced for public than for private investment. A possible reason for the 
lack of a measurable above time-trend increase in public investment could be that, as outlined in 
Section 3, with the introduction of the E-HIPCI in 1999 and although under MDRI, a strong emphasis 
was put on the implementation of the short- and medium-term Poverty Reduction Strategies (World 
Bank, 2002). The ambitious goal of poverty reduction, while laudable, might have come at the cost of 
higher government consumption and lower investment expenditure, as the long-term effects of socio-
economic investment were considered second-order priorities in governments’ target functions. 
However, this hypothesis needs further investigation to be substantiated. 
The observed positive effect on private investment suggests that the reduction of public debt has 
indeed led, as suggested by Borensztein (1990) and Diwan and Rodrik (1992), to a decline in the 
socio-economic cost associated with unsustainable public debt, either by fostering a more favourable 
macro-economic environment or by augmented return expectations. This raises the question as to 
whether the positive treatment effect of debt relief on private investment has been strong enough to 
have meaningful effects on growth. 
c. Debt Overhang and Growth  
To determine the ATET of HIPCI- and MDRI-based debt cancellation on GNI per capita, a reduced-
form growth model as utilized in Barro (1997) and subsequently in Clements et al. (2003), Pattillo et 
al. (2003), Presbitero (2008), and Cordella et al. (2010) is applied to the difference-in-differences 
framework. The dependent variable is the difference between the four year pre- and post-treatment 
averages of real GNI per capita (in logarithms), thereby approximating the average percentage 
increase in control and treatment group countries during the implementation of HIPCI and MDRI.  
The specification is in the form of Eq. 6 and includes the standard pre-treatment as well as time variant 
controls (the former are those that are possibly endogenous, the latter are those that are entirely 
exogenous with respect to treatment). The applied pre-treatment controls are those identified in 
previous research to determine development countries’ growth paths, i.e. the initial level of real GDP 
per capita to account for the convergence assumption (Barro, 1997; challenged by Easterly, 2001), the 
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level of trade openness (measured as ratio of exports to GDP, cf. Sachs and Warner, 1995), the terms 
of trade to approximate a country’s relative beneficiary position in international trade (Cordella et al., 
2010), and the initial level of inflation (in natural logarithms). As the availability of terms of trade data 
is limited, thereby reducing the number of total observations in the regression, the growth equation is 
estimated with (Table 3, estimation results IV-VI) and without (Table 3, estimation results I-III) the 
terms of trade covariate. As can be seen, the economic and statistical significance of the variables of 
interest is not affected by the inclusion or exclusion of the terms of trade variable. 
Again, the State Fragility Index developed by Marshall and Cole (2011) has been included as time 
invariant pre-treatment variable to control for the anticipated positive effect of political, economic and 
social stability on growth, as HIPCs appear to be systematically less stable than non-HIPCs. As for the 
regression specifications in Section 4a, an SSA dummy is applied to avoid potential confounding of 
treatment and region specific effects. Furthermore, in line with the assumption of capital formation 
being an important determinate of economic growth, the estimation specification controls for pre-
treatment total (Table 3, results I and IV), public (Table 3, results II and V) and private gross fixed 
capital formation (Table 3, results III and VI), respectively. As indicators on human capital (mostly 
approximated using secondary school enrolment rates), in all cases remained statistically and 
economically insignificant (cp. Barro, 1997 and Clements et. al., 2003), they are omitted in the current 
specification.  
Following the more recent literature on determinates of growth (Easterly and Levine, 2001; Pattillo et 
al., 2003) which identifies TFP as the principal explanatory force for cross-country and over-time 
variation in per capita growth rates, with capital accumulation of only subordinate importance, the 
average pre-treatment level of TFP has been included.40 As population growth can be considered 
exogenous of debt relief, it is included as time variant variable. Population growth may negatively 
affect the level of GNI per capita as it, if associated with a growing labour force, results in a decline in 
the capital-to-labour-ratio, thereby reducing productivity per capita (Barro, 1997).  
The results suggest the following: While the pre-treatment level of national investment (particularly 
public investment), the regional dummy, the fragility and governance proxy and particularly the level 
of total factor productivity appear to be decisive factors in determining per capita GNI growth during 
the observation period, the treatment dummy is negative but statistically insignificant in all six 
specifications. This would suggest that debt relief under HIPCI and MDRI has apparently not had a 
substantive positive effect on growth, despite the indications that the two debt relief initiatives had 
substantive positive effects on private investment.  
  
                                                
40 The data are drawn from UNIDO’s World Productivity Database, which contains information on the level and the growth 
of productivity for 112 countries from 1960 to 2000. The database has the comparative advantage that it for the first time 
provides time- and cross-section-consistent data for a large sample of developing countries. The level of TFP is calculated as 
an index and relative to U.S. total factor productivity. A more detailed description is provided in Appendix V. 
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Table 3: Impact of debt relief on real GNI per capita growth 
Variable I II III IV V VI 
Treatment Dummy -0.153 -0.090 -0.062 -0.206 -0.141 -0.113 
(-0.96)  (-0.52)  (-0.35)  (-1.22)  (-0.76)  (-0.60)  
SSA Dummy  -0.053 -0.063 -0.047 -0.090 -0.124 -0.119 
(-0.56)  (-0.52)  (-0.46)  (-0.85)  (-1.15)  (-1.04)  
State Fragility Index 
(pre-treatment) 
-0.023 -0.024 -0.029 * -0.022 -0.025 -0.027 
(-1.56)  (-1.61)  (-1.83)  (-1.22)  (-1.36)  (-1.37)  
Trade Openness 
(pre-treatment) 
0.042 0.044 0.037 0.062 0.068 0.068 
(0.61)  (0.63)  (0.51)  (0.83)  (0.92)  (0.91) 
Terms of Trade index 
(pre-treatment) n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.124 -0.156 -0.167 
 
    (-0.77)  (-0.96)  (-0.99) 
Inflation 
(pre-treatment) 
0.013 0.012 -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 0.008 
(0.32)  (0.29)  (-0.15)  (-0.09)  (-0.20)  (0.16) 
GNI per capita 
(pre-treatment) 
0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 
(6.33)  (6.11)  (5.22)  (6.03)  (5.76)  (5.09)  
Population growth 
(time variant) 
0.051 0.043 0.004 0.033 0.018 -0.016 
(1.66) (1.25) (0.12) (1.02) (0.55) (-0.50) 
GFCF in percent of 
GDP (pre-treatment) 0.308 *** - n.a. 0.244 ** - n.a.  (3.03)  (2.38)    
Public GFCF in 
percent of GDP 
(pre-treatment) 
- 0.288 *** n.a. n.a. 0.200 * n.a. 
  (2.63)    (1.94)    
Private GFCF in 
percent of GDP 
(pre-treatment) 
- - 0.111 n.a. - 0.063 
   (1.47)     (0.90)  
TFP index 
(pre-treatment) 
0.335 ** 0.328 ** 0.343 ** 0.274 * 0.251 * 0.249 * 
(2.22)  (2.19)  (2.22)  (1.96)  (1.87)  (1.76)  
N 70 66 66 66 60 60 
Baseline 35 33 33 33 30 30 
o/w control 11 10 10 9 8 8 
o/w treated 24 23 23 24 22 22 
Follow-up 35 33 33 33 30 30 
o/w control 11 10 10 9 8 8 
o/w treated 24 23 23 24 22 22 
R2 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.87 
F-test 51.82 46.92 45.36 52.25 48.46 54.28 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Robust standard errors (Huber/White robust variance estimates) are used. 
This result raises the question as to why HIPCI and MDRI have not been more successful in 
stimulating economic growth. There are three possible answers, which might have joint or partial 
validity: First, it may simply be too early to tell, as more time may be needed before the positive 
growth effects of debt relief become visible and measurable. If the level of public debt is a determinate 
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of economic growth over the long-term, the post treatment period covered in the empirical analysis 
may be too brief to reveal possible stimulating effects. As indicated, most HIPCs reached the 
completion point in the years between 2000 and 2006, such that positive treatment effects may not be 
reflected in the 2007 to 2010 data. 
Second, while HIPCI and MDRI apparently have been successful in stimulating private investment, a 
positive effect on public investment, measurable vis-à-vis the treatment group, is, as discussed above, 
not observable. Yet as the results from the growth regression and previous research suggest (Clements 
et al., 2003), public investment is at least as important in stimulating economic growth as private 
investment. Therefore, one important mechanism through which debt relief is expected to trigger 
growth in accordance with the debt overhang hypothesis – namely, through the enhancement of public 
investment – appears broken, at least for the HIPCI and MDRI.  
Third, and probably most importantly, while the two initiatives have had some impact on capital 
accumulation, it seems that the HIPCI and MDRI are not associated with measureable above time-
trend increase in TFP, which, according to the results presented here and confirming earlier findings 
by Easterly and Levine (2001) and Pattillo et al. (2003), is the second and actually most important 
channel through which debt relief is expected to boost economic growth.  
As Table 4 shows both, HIPCs’ average pre-treatment level of TFP and the average annual growth 
rates in TFP during the treatment period remain significantly below those for non-HIPCs during the 
period of HIPCI and MDRI implementation. 
Table 4: Total Factor Productivity for HIPCs and non-HIPCs 
Period  HIPCs (I) Non-HIPCs (II) T-test 
Pre-treatment level 
(TFP-index; relative to U.S. TFP) 
Average 0.170 0.236 H1: Diff (II-I)>0: 
Pr(T > t) = 0.00 S.E. 0.01 0.02 
Average annual TFP growth rate  
1996-2010 in percent 
Average 0.129 0.605 H1: Diff (II-I)>0: 
Pr(T > t) = 0.10 S.E. 0.19 0.34 
N: 22 14  
 
Furthermore, if it is assumed that the main channel for enhancing productivity is economic policy and 
adjustment effort, as suggested by Krugman (1988) and Easterly and Levine (2001), then the results 
may point towards the fact, that the HIPCI and MDRI are not associated with effective productivity 
enhancing policies. 
5. Conclusion 
The HIPCI and MDRI represent the largest and most comprehensive effort to permanently eliminate 
unsustainable levels of public external debt in low income countries thus far. The debt overhang 
hypothesis as developed by Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1989) has been a principal building block in 
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the intellectual edifice underpinning these debt relief initiatives. This hypothesis claims that if a debt 
overhang is accumulated or inherited, it discourages productivity enhancing investment and 
adjustment efforts, thereby leading to an inefficiently low level of future output. 
While a growing strand in the literature has found some evidence that the over-accumulation of debt 
appears to have negative effects on capital accumulation and factor productivity, the implicit converse 
assumption underlying the HIPCI and MDRI – namely, that debt relief therefore must be associated 
with increased investment activity, growth in TFP and a subsequently increase in economic output – 
has previously never been validated, primarily due to a lack of relevant data. As almost all beneficiary 
countries have by now received irrevocable cancelation of debt under the HIPCI and MDRI, the two 
initiatives serve as an ideal test case for examining the debt overhang hypothesis, as least as it applies 
to debt relief measures for low income countries.  
Using a quasi-experimental research design to compare the performance of investment and growth 
between low income countries that have benefited from relief (HIPCs) and those that have not (non-
HIPCs), this study assessed whether debt relief under the HIPCI and MDRI has yielded the expected 
effects.  
The empirical results do not confirm the mechanisms posited by the debt overhang hypothesis. While 
the HIPCI and MDRI appear to have been partially successful in stimulating private investment, a 
measurable positive effect on public investment is not observable. As public investment is at least as 
equally decisive in enhancing economic growth as public investment, key assumptions concerning 
how debt relief is expected to drive growth as per the debt overhang hypothesis would appear to be 
erroneous. A possible reason for why debt relief fails to stimulate public investment could be the 
strong emphasis put on short and medium-term poverty reduction within the scope of the HIPCI and 
MDRI. This emphasis may have led to higher government consumption and lower investment 
expenditure. Nevertheless, further research is required to investigate this question. 
Most importantly, the data show that the HIPCI and MDRI have not had positive effects on TFP; in 
fact the average TFP growth rate for HIPCs stayed well below that of non-HIPCs. As the more recent 
literature (Easterly and Levine, 2001; Pattillo et al., 2003) identifies TFP as a principal factor that 
accounts for cross-country and over-time variation in per capita growth rates, the systematically weak 
performance of HIPCs is not surprising. If Krugman’s (1988) argument that productivity growth is 
primarily achieved through macroeconomic adjustment and policy reform is correct, the results 
presented indicate that the HIPCI and MDRI are ineffective in facilitating the adoption of 
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Appendix I: Cutoff dates applied to Naples Terms and HIPCI operations 





Burkina Faso 01/01/1991 
Burundi 06/20/1999 
Cameroon 06/20/1999 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 06/30/1983 
Congo, Rep. 01/01/1986 

















Sao Tome 04/01/1999 
Senegal 01/01/1983 












Appendix II: Country Categories 








Treatment1) Control Group1) 
1 Afghanistan 2007 2010 X  
2 Albania    X 
3 Angola    X 
4 Armenia    X 
5 Azerbaijan    X 
6 Bangladesh    X 
7 Benin 2000 2003 X  
8 Bhutan***     
9 Bolivia 2000 2001 X  
10 Burkina Faso 2000 2002 X  
11 Burundi 2005 2009 X  
12 Cambodia    X 
13 Cameroon 2000 2006 X  
14 Cape Verde*     
15 Central African Rep. 2007 2009 X  
16 Chad** 2001    
17 Comoros* 2010    
18 Congo 2007 2010 X  
19 Congo, Dem. Rep. 2003 2010 X  
20 Côte d’Ivoire** 2009    
21 Djibouti*     
22 Dominica*     
23 Egypt    X 
24 Equatorial Guinea*     
25 Eritrea    X 
26 Ethiopia 2001 2004 X  
27 Gambia 2000 2007 X  
28 Georgia    X 
29 Ghana 2002 2004 X  
30 Grenada*     
31 Guinea** 2000    
32 Guinea-Bissau 2003 2010 X  
33 Guyana* 2000 2003   
34 Haiti 2006 2009 X  
35 Honduras 2000 2005 X  
36 Indonesia    X 
37 Kenya    X 
38 Kiribati     
39 Kyrgyzstan    X 
40 Lao People’s Dem Rep.    X 
41 Lesotho    X 
42 Liberia 2008 2010 X  
43 Madagascar 2000 2004 X  
44 Malawi 2000 2006 X  
45 Maldives*     
46 Mali 2000 2003 X  
47 Marshall Islands    X 
48 Mauritania 2000 2002 X  
49 Micronesia    X 
50 Moldova    X 
51 Mongolia    X 
52 Mozambique 2000 2001 X  
53 Myanmar    X 
54 Nepal    X 
55 Nicaragua 2000 2004 X  
56 Niger 2000 2004 X  
57 Nigeria    X 
58 Pakistan    X 
59 Papua New Guinea    X 
60 Rwanda 2000 2005 X  
28 
 
61 St. Lucia*     
62 St. Vincent and Grenadines*     
63 Samoa*     
64 Sao Tome and Principe* 2000 2007   
65 Senegal 2000 2004 X  
66 Sierra Leone 2002 2006 X  
67 Solomon Islands*     
68 Somalia    X 
69 Sri Lanka     
70 Sudan    X 
71 Tajikistan    X 
72 Tanzania 2000 2001 X  
73 Togo** 2008 2011   
74 Tonga    X 
75 Tuvalu     
76 Uganda 2000 2000 X  
77 Uzbekistan     
78 Vanuatu*     
79 Vietnam    X 
80 Yemen    X 
81 Zambia 2000 2005 X  
82 Zimbabwe    X 
Total    29 30 
1) Subject to data availability 
*IDA eligible under small island country exception. Due to economic specifics, they have been excluded from the sample. 
** Excluded from sample because completion point reached after December 2010. 
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Appendix IV: Modalities and volumes of concessional debt relief operations since 1988 
 Classical Terms 
 





Application Period Until Sept. 1988 Oct. 1989–June 1991 Dec. 1991–Dec. 1994 Jan. 1995–Nov. 1996 Dec.1996–Oct. 1999 Since Nov. 1999 Since January 2006 
Eligibility       HIPC completion 
point 














(reduction of PV in 
percent) 
n.a. 20-332) 50 67 80 90 100 
Treatment of Non-concessional debt1) 
Option 1: Debt Reduction (rescheduling at market interest rates) 
Grace period n.a. 8 6 6 6 6 n.a. 
Maturity n.a. 14 23 23 23 23 n.a. 
Option 2: Debt Service Reduction (at concessional interest rates) 
Grace period n.a. 8 n.a. 3 8 n.a. n.a. 
Maturity n.a. 14 23 33 40 n.a. n.a. 
Option 3: Capitalization of Memorandum Interest (at concessional interest rates) 
Grace period n.a. n.a. 5 8 8 n.a. n.a. 
Maturity n.a. n.a. 23 33 40 n.a. n.a. 
Option 4: Longer Maturities (at market interest rate, non-concessional rescheduling) 
Grace period 5-6 14 16 20 20 n.a. n.a. 
Maturity 10 25 25 40 40 n.a. n.a. 
Treatment of ODA (excluded from PV reductions) 
Grace period (years) 5-6 14 12 16 16 16 n.a. 
Maturity (years) 10 25 30 40 40 40 n.a. 
Memorandum items: 
No. of agreements 
reached 
87 28 24 38    
HIPCs receiving 
treatment 
28 20 22 26    
Nominal amounts 
consolidated 
USD 23 billion USD 6 billion USD 9 billion USD 17.5 billion USD 76.0 billion (end-2010 PV terms) USD 52.5 billion
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Appendix V: Data Sources and Summary Statistics  
Data Sources 
Data Description (taken from source): Source: 
Exports of Goods 
and Services (% of 
GDP 
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services 
provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, 
transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, 
construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They 
exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) 
and transfer payments. 
World Bank, WDI, 
national accounts data 
External debt 
stocks, public and 
publicly guaranteed 
(PPGD)  
Public and publicly guaranteed debt comprises long-term external obligations of public 
debtors, including the national government, political subdivisions (or an agency of either), 
and autonomous public bodies, and external obligations of private debtors that are guaranteed 
for repayment by a public entity. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
World Bank, Global 
Development Finance 
GDP in current US$  GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from 
domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the 
official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange 
transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. 
World Bank, national 
accounts data 
GNI per capita Gross national income per capita is converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas 
method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident 
producers plus any product taxes not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of 
primary income from abroad. GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted to 
U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies, although an 
alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an 
exceptionally large margin from the rate actually applied in international transactions. To 
smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is 
used by the World Bank. 
World Bank national 
accounts data, and 
OECD National 
Accounts data 
Gross fixed capital 
formation (% of 
GDP) 
Gross fixed capital formation (formerly gross domestic fixed investment) includes land 
improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment 
purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, 
hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. According 
to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation. 
World Bank national 
accounts data, and 
OECD National 
Accounts data 
Gross fixed capital 
formation, private 
sector (% of GDP) 
Private investment covers gross outlays by the private sector (including private nonprofit 
agencies) on additions to its fixed domestic assets. 
World Bank national 
accounts data, and 
OECD National 
Accounts data 
Imports of Goods 
and Services (% of 
GDP 
Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services 
received from the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, 
insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, 
construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They 
exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) 
and transfer payments. 
World Bank, WDI, 
national accounts data 
Inflation Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in 
the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be 





ODA per capita ODA consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of 
principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the DAC, by multilateral 
institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in 
countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes loans with a grant 
element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Assistance 
related to debt treatment has been excluded. This comprises OECD/DAC purpose codes 
60020 (debt forgiveness), 60030 (relief of multilateral debt), 60040 (rescheduling and 
refinancing), 60061 (debt for development swap), 60062 (other debt swap), and 60063 (debt 




(annual in %) 
Annual population growth rate for year t is the exponential rate of growth of midyear 
population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage. Population is based on the de facto 
definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--
except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally 
considered part of the population of the country of origin. 
World Bank, WDI  
State Fragility 
Index 
The State Fragility Index by Marshall and Cole lists all independent countries in which the 
total country population is greater than 500,000 in 2011 (165 countries). The Fragility Matrix 
scores each country on effectiveness and legitimacy in four performance dimensions: 
security, political, economic, and social. Each of the matrix indicators is rated on a four-point 
fragility scale: 0 “no fragility,” 1 “low fragility,” 2 “medium fragility,” and 3 “high fragility” 
with the exception of the economic effectiveness indicator, which is rated on a five-point 
fragility scale (including 4 “extreme fragility”). The State Fragility Index, then, combines 
scores on the eight indicators and ranges from 0 “no fragility” to 25 “extreme fragility.” A 
country’s fragility is closely associated with its state capacity to manage conflict; make and 
implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in 
maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to 




Data Description (taken from source): Source: 
challenges and crises, and sustaining progressive development. 
Terms of Trade Net barter terms of trade index is calculated as the percentage ratio of the export unit value 
indexes to the import unit value indexes, measured relative to the base year 2000. Unit value 
indexes are based on data reported by countries that demonstrate consistency under 
UNCTAD quality controls, supplemented by UNCTAD’s estimates using the previous year’s 
trade values at the Standard International Trade Classification three-digit level as weights. To 
improve data coverage, especially for the latest periods, UNCTAD constructs a set of average 
prices indexes at the three-digit product classification of the Standard International Trade 
Classification revision 3 using UNCTAD’s Commodity Price Statistics, interna-tional and 
national sources, and UNCTAD secretariat estimates and calculates unit value indexes at the 
country level using the current year’s trade values as weights. 
UNCTAD, Handbook 
of Statistics and data 






The TFP estimates rest on the assumption of a standard Cobb-Douglas production function 
with constant returns to scale and Hick-neutral technical change in a perfectly competition 
setting on factor markets. For a detailed technical description of the data sources and the 




Urbanization (% of 
total) 
Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical 
offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the 
United Nations World Urbanization Prospects. 





Variable  Treated Control 
  Mean SD Min. Max. N Mean SD Min. Max N 
Total Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (% of GDP) Baseline 16.73 5.49 7.69 25.57 24 21.04 11.70 10.34 69.59 27
Follow-up 22.42 5.63 10.45 35.24 24 23.36 8.15 4.11 40.61 27
Gross fixed capital 
formation, private sector (% 
of GDP) 
Baseline 9.19 5.46 -0.60 22.23 23 14.70 11.13 0.72 51.27 22
Follow-up 14.64 6.69 5.86 29.48 24 14.45 7.28 1.26 26.31 23
Gross fixed capital 
formation, public sector  
(% of GDP) 
Baseline 7.67 3.03 2.76 13.75 23 6.10 4.41 0.81 18.32 22
Follow-up 7.76 3.34 2.38 15.95 24 7.79 4.91 1.99 25.58 23
GNI per capita (in constant 
2000 USD, Atlas method) Baseline 398.64 232.20 153.00 877.5 24 463.67 206.86 152.50 1,002.50 27
Follow-up 715.08 465.00 195 1,872.50 28 1,911.42 2,522.25 285.00 13,632.50 28
ODA received (per capita) Baseline 42.97 40.12 5.67 214.93 28 20.05 19.36 0.26 71.61 25
Trade Openness Baseline 51.65 18.91 16.36 100.52 25 70.53 32.98 3.57 156.65 29
State Fragility Index Baseline 17.81 3.46 13 25 27 15.61 4.22 8 24 29
Terms of Trade Index Baseline 114.24 38.52 60.10 255.88 18 97.94 34.61 35.09 186.78 14
Urbanization (% of total 
population Baseline 32.14 15.28 7.2 59.40 28 32.14 14.44 10.90 66.30 29
 Follow-up 37.63 16.66 10.25 65.35 28 36.09 13.67 12.55 63.90 29
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